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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
of the courts. Patton v. United States, supra; Belt v. United States, supra;
see Commonwealth v. Rowe, supra.
The principal case admits that the right of jury trial is not guaranteed
to the state. Then, as the dissent points out, how can a waiver deprive the
prosecution of that which it has never possessed? Furthermore, in follow-
ing People v. Fisher, supra, the historical conception that the jury is a
privilege which can be waived is accepted. These concessions are not logi-
cally compatible with the conclusion that the prosecution can prevent waiver.
The real basis of the decision seems to be the conviction that it is to the in-
terest of the state to preserve the rights of its individual citizens by not al-
lowing the accused, alone, to entrust his life to the judgment of a single
person. N. P., '34.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJuPY OUTSIDE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.-By dis-
tinguishing between the capacity of a servant acting in the course of his
master's employment and that in which he acts when in the exercise of a
public right valuable to himself as a facility for gaining a livelihood, the
defendant was held not liable for the act of a messenger boy who, for the
purpose of effecting the defendant's business, dashed out of the defendant's
establishment and negligently collided with a pedestrian on the sidewalk.
Ritchey v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 31 S. W. (2d)
628. A directed verdict ordered for defendant by the trial court was up-
held by the appellate court.
The case is interesting in presenting the view that a master's vicarious
liability under the rule of respondeat superior will not result from an act
performed by the servant in a method or manner incident to his rights as a
public citizen. That the injury results from an act done to effectuate the
master's purpose becomes only of secondary importance. It is clear that
when the employee acts for his own independent purpose, the master will
not be liable. Coates v. Auto Sales Co. (1928) 106 W. Va. 380, 145 S. E.
644; Dennes v. Jefferson Meat Market (1929) 228 Ky. 164, 14 S. W. (2d)
408; Martin v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Line (1929) 197 N. C. 720, 150
S. E. 501. But there is a manifest difference between the situation of an
employee acting for an entirely independent purpose of his own and that
when he acts in reference to the master's purpose. Guitar v. Wheeler (Tex.
1931) 36 S. W. (2d) 325; Lee v. Nathan (1924) 67 Cal. App. 111, 226 Pac.
970. When the employee used an automobile on the public streets for the
furtherance of the employer's business, the fact that the employee used the
street under his public right was not considered by the court in the de-
termination of the question of whether the act was performed in the course
of the employment. Edwards v. Earnest (1922) 208 Ala. 539, 94 So. 593;
Ricketts v. Thos. Tilling, Limited (1915) 1 K. B. 644; Riley v. Standard Oil
of New York (1921) 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97, 22 A. L. R. 1382.
The decisions rendered under the Workmen's Compensation Acts of the
various states dealing with the somewhat analogous problem of accidents
arising out of the course of the employment indicate a holding contrary to
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
that of the principal case. Thus where an employee's work required that
he cross a street to mail letters, an injury resulting in the act was held one
rising out of the course of the employment. Globe Indem. Co. v. Indus.
Ace. Comm. of Cal. (1918) 36 Cal. App. 280, 171 Pac. 1088, 16 N. C. C. A.
907, 2 W. C. L. J. 31; so where an errand boy was injured while delivering
checks for the employer. Chicago Packing Co. v. Industrial Board (1918)
282 Ill. 497, 118 N. E. 727. The Missouri decisions are in accord. The de-
fendant was held liable when the servant was injured while going to call
on a customer. Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co. (Mo. 1930) 29
S. W. (2d) 128, and the same result was reached in Howes v. Stark Bros.
Nurseries & Orchard Co. (Mo. 1930) 22 S. W. 839 where a servant was in-
jured while on his way to take a bus home after completing his work.
These cases of course, are not directly pertinent since the issue is not
one of vicarious liability of the employer, but one of direct liability under a
duty imposed by statute. Their significance lies in the disregard of the
question as to the capacity of the employee in reference to the particular act
by which he was injured. To the extent that the phrase "in the course of
employment" is interpreted without regard to the fact that the employee
might well have been involved in the same situation while acting on his
own business and in his own private right, there is an inconsistency between
the cases noted above and the principal case.
To determine what the course of employment is, in order to ascertain the
employer's liability either to a third person for the negligent act of the
servant, or to the servant himself, under the Compensation Acts, the essen-
tial fact is whether the act was intended for and did effect the ultimate
purpose of the employment. To preclude the vicarious liability of the
master because a servant makes use of the public right, to which use the
master gives the original impetus, would unduly narrow the operation of
the rule of r'espondeat superior. La Bella v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 1072; Cochran v. Michels (W. Va. 1931)
157 S. E. 173. Schedwig v. McDermott (Cal. App. 1931) 298 Pac. 107.
Undoubtedly many cases may be found in which the doctrine of respondeat
superior has been applied so as to render the master liable, when on closer
examination, it might be made clear that the servant was acting in a man-
ner or method open to him as a member of the public. Yet it could not be
asserted with a degree of plausibility that the decisions in those cases should
be, and might have been altered, by the distinction made in the principal
case.
The inference that a court may draw from an act which a servant performs
on a public street must be restricted to the actual evidence produced tending
to show for whose purpose and enjoyment the act was committed. Orr v.
Thompson Coal Co. (Ill. 1920) 219 Il. App. 116. Kyle v. Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. (1925) 118 Kan. 300, 235 Pac. 116. Certainly the facts of the
principal case raised a sufficient presumption that the messenger was acting
to execute some purpose or activity of the master so that the case should
have been presented to the jury on the issue of fact. L. S., '33.
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